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In a review of Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action in the first issue 
of this journal, Richard Wagner called attention to the important role political 
leadership can play in the provision of collective goods [2]. As Frohlich, Oppen- 
heimer and Young note, however, the conce t of a i~olitical leader (entrepreneur) is P 
not, in and of itself, an adequate explanation of the supply of collective goods. As 
Olson argues, the basic problem is that individuals have little, if any, incentive to 
voluntarily contribute toward the supply of a collective good. In the absence of 
such an incentive, the flow of resources that a political entrepreneur can control is 
severely limited, and the likelihood of his achieving a "profit" is correspondingly 
small. A successful theory of political leadership constructed within the framework 
of theory of collective goods must establish linkages between the behavior of group 
members, the supply of the collective good, and the profit of the political entre- 
preneur. In this book the authors attempt to construct such a theory. Using a 
decision-theoretic model of individual behavior in collective goods situations they 
generate a variety of propositions concerning political leadership and the supply of 
collective goods. The first two chapters of the book develop the model in a non- 
competitive context, and it is then generalized to the competitive case in the 
following two chapters, where the problems of both incumbent and opposition 
leaders are considered. Chapter Five and Appendix One discuss the problem of 
strategic interaction in collective goods situations and relate the authors' con- 
clusions to those of Olson. 
Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young define a political entrepreuner as "any 
individual who acts to supply a collective good without providing all of the re- 
sources himself" (p.6). In my opinion, the attempt to construct a theory that 
encompasses all political leaders is unfortunate, for by its very nature, a theory with 
such generality cannot focus on many of the subtleties associated with any par- 
ticular type of political leadership. For instance, it would appear to be easier for 
candidates for electoral office to secure the resources necessary for a leader's sur- 
lUS than for leaders of  interest groups, because the prime resource sought by the 
rmer group is votes, which citizens seem more willing to part with than their time 
or money. Another important distinction between these two types of political 
leadership concerns the role of opposition. The winner of an electoral contest has a 
monopoly on the main source "profit", but it ispossible for a group of citizens to 
support on equal terms the co-existence of several interest groups with very similar 
goals. While the authors mention differences such as these, they are not incor- 
Orated formally into their analysis, and the quality of the propositions derived 
om the model suffers as a result. 
As noted earlier, the key element of a theory of political leadership in the 
context of collective goods is how revenue (in the form of a variety of resources) is 
secured by a leader from a group of individuals who have little incentive to make 
voluntary contributions toward the provision of a collective good. Frohlich, Oppen- 
heimer and Young suggest four potential sources of revenue, each represented by an 
entry in a 2 x 2 table in which each revenue source is classified by (1) whether the 
individual contributes in return for collective or private benefits and (2) whether 
the incentive for a contribution results from a positive inducement or from the 
threat of a negative sanction. The four potential sources of revenue are labeled 
donations (collective-positive), purchases or contracts (private-positive), taxation 
(private-negative), and extortion (collective-negative.) 
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Purchases and contracts include Olson's notion of selective incentives as well 
as another important class of exchanges. Included in the mathematical formulation 
of the theory are two terms which represent the expenditures necessary for the 
maintenance of an organization that supplies a collective good and the expenditures 
incurred in actually supplying the coUec-tive good. The fact that these expenditures 
must be made gives rise to another source of revenue, for as the authors note, 
"From the perspective of the ordinary members, (these expenditures) 
are potential "contracts". A recipient of such contracts might be willing 
to offer contributions to get them so long as these contributions are 
smaller than the expected profits from his contracts." (p. 37) 
This notion of contracts represents one of the most intriguing contributions of the 
book. It is interesting to  note that included in this category are kickbacks and 
bribes given to public officials in exchange for awards of public contracts. Recent 
history certainly attests to the importance of this source of revenue for some 
political leaders. 
The other new revenue source suggested by Frohlich, Oppenheimer and 
Young is that of  extortion - a contribution toward the provision of a collective 
good made as a result of the threat of a collective, negative sanction. The authors 
suggest as an example the threat of random terrorist activities, which e x  a n t e  
threaten everyone. The authors do not treat this source in depth, however, but 
combine it with taxation in their analysis. 
To a large extent, I think that the degree of success one attributes to the 
theory developed in this book is dependent upon the satisfaction one finds with the 
authors treatment of donations - voluntary donations toward the supply of a col- 
lective good. Part of Chapter One (pp. 32-36), Chapter 5, and Appendix One are 
devated to this question, which the authors label the problem of strategic inter- 
action. In addition, the interested reader would do well to read an earlier presen* 
tation of the ideas by two of the authors [1]. The authors utilize a decision 
theoretic model of the donation problem, in contrast with the Cournot duopoly 
and non-cooperative game models which yield Olson's results. In the decision 
theory model, each individual determines his optimal contribution by assessing a 
probability distribution over the total contribution of others, and choosing the level 
of donation that maximizes his utility. The fact that all individuals carry out this 
process simultaneously introduces the problems of strategic interaction. No restric- 
tions are placed by the authors on the distributions that rational individuals may 
assess. The result of  this is that, not surprisingly, very little can be said about the 
optimal level of donation for an individual or what would happen to the optimal 
level of donation if the group size were to change. Clearly, if any probability 
distribution over the actions of others is admissible, almost anything can be an 
optimal action in some circumstance. The authors justify the use of this model on 
the basis that: 
"at the present tirade we are devoid of laws concerning the relevant 
human behavior with respect to the supply of costly collective goods. 
Rather than introducing a set of arbitrary assumptions, therefore, we 
have emphasized the indeterminacies that are a necessary consequence 
of the present state of our knowledge concerning the supply of  collec- 
tive goods." (p. 127) 
To anyone who has considered problems of strategic interaction at any length, 
emphasis on the indeterminacy of such problems is probably u~anecessary. If 
anything, this analysis convinces me that the (arbitrary) assumptions of a analysis 
using game theory or oligopoly theory are to be preferred to no assumptions at all. 
The authors would have done well to consider placing some restrictions on the 
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probability distributions that individuals can "reasonably" hold and to investigate 
the effects of these in an attempt to narrow clown the range of possible "rational" 
behavior. In addition, the authors do not consider behavior over time, in which an 
individual's expectations regarding the behavior of others might reach some 
equilibrium. Consideration of this line of thought suggest two important questions: 
1) if such an equilibrium exists, how would it differ from the equilibrium of 
analysis using game theory or oligopoly theory, and 2) if such an equilibrium does 
not exist, of what use is the theory in studying political behavior that continues 
over time? 
The indeterminancy of the strategic interaction problem concerning dona- 
tions spills over into the consideration of the other revenue sources as well. For a 
leader must decide upon the optimal mix of revenue sources, and in general it seems 
reasonable that the use of any other source of revenue would decrease the flow of 
donations (although that would depend upon the probability assessments of the 
individuals). The indeterminacy of the donation problem thus introduces an equiva- 
lent degree of indeterminancy into the consideration of the optimal mix of revenue 
s o u r c e s .  
One can view this book in either of two ways, as an effort in mathematical 
modelling of political phenomena or as a series of observations on political leader- 
ship for which use the theory of collective goods is a useful organizing device. The 
chief problem with the book as a piece of formal modeIling is its lack of rigor. A 
mathematical model of behavior ks presented, but very little is actually done with it. 
The modelling consists almost entirely of setting up an expected utility equation 
and differentiating it to determine the optimal action The model is so general that 
one does not really need the equation at all to derive the consequences they 
often follow from the definition of the equation rather than from any manipulation 
of the model. For example, Chapter Two, "Consequences of Noncompetitive Poli- 
tics" contains no mathematics at all. All of the consequences are "derived" ver- 
bally. Some of the consequences border on being tautological (e.g. "Competition 
will be supplied only when some individual finds it profitable to do so ). In add- 
tion, assumptions whose necessity is questionable to begin with appear to go un- 
used (e.g. individuals are selfish and individuals are aware of the preferences and 
past actions of others). Since little is actually done with the model, these problems 
are not of great importance• They are, nevertheless, indicative of the lack of rigor 
which characterizes the book• 
Read as a collection of observations about political leadership, the book fares 
somewhat better. The discussion of revenue sources is quite good, and the dis- 
cussion of competitive politics generates some interesting ideas concerning the 
• ' ' b optimal mix of resources and the ability of a leader to attract contribution s y 
manipulating information received by the group members. As an inspection of the 
list of propositions derived in the book (pp. 138-142) will show, however, the focus 
of the analysis ranges widely, at times considering topics only tangentially related 
to the book's central theme• A more rigorous treatment of a more narrowly defined 
set of topics would have been a considerable improvement over the present torm or 
the book• 
John Chamberlin 
Institute of Public Policy Studies 
The University of Michigan 
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For a number of years, James Coleman has been interested in the situation 
which arises when an individual "invests" his own power, influence, or funds in 
some kind of collective body. This brier collection of lectures is a general presenta- 
tion of his views on the problem. It is deceptively simple in preparation, but 
actually it will repay careful study. Before dealing with the bulk of the book, 
however, I would like to raise two minor, more or less linguistic, issues. 
Coleman argues that in present-day society individuals frequently feel rela- 
tively powerless because they have invested their power in "corporations" such as 
labor unions, business corporations, coops, or democratic governments. It seems to 
me that, although there may be some reduction in actual power by an individual 
from joining one of these institutions, the more accurate statement would be that 
there is a rearrangement of his power so that he has more power over things that do 
not concern him very much and tess power over things that concern him a great 
deal. Consider 365 housewives, each of whom makes decisions as to what her 
family will eat each day. A collective enterprise is established under which each of 
the housewives is permitted to make decisions for all 365 of them on one day of 
the year, but then is bound by the other decisions on the remaining 364 days. The 
power of the housewife has not declined; she still makes 365 family-day menu 
decisions. What has happened, however, is that she now has power over matters that 
do not concern her very much, i.e., the menu of other families, and much less 
control over something which concerns her a good deal. 
In addition to this phenomenon, no doubt there is a genuine reduction in 
individual ~0ower from the joining of many collective organizations; but the re- 
directing otpower  seems to me a more important phenomenon. As a matter of fact, 
this is not a significant criticism of Coleman's book because he could change the 
language a little bit and end up saying substantively the same thing he says now. 
My second criticism is also essentially linguistic and it concerns Coleman's 
view that "corporations" act in various ways on individuals. The actions are the 
actions of individuals who are involved somehow in the corporation. The cor- 
poration's existence simply changes the constraints under which these individuals 
act. This again is not something that would surprise Coleman; indeed, he says it 
toward the end of  his discussion. I prefer a different language. 
Leaving these two essentially linguistic problems aside, however, the book is a 
sophisticated and well thought out discussion of a real and difficult problem. As 
Coleman points out, there are many reasons why we might wish to create elective 
bodies to perform various services for us. Once these organizations have been cre- 
ated, however, they do change the world and adjustment to these organizations is 
important for us. It is to a description of the problems that can arise and a rather 
brief but very suggestive discussion of the possible remedies that the bulk of these 
lectures is devoted. Coleman's book isdifferent from much modern emoting in this 
general area in that he never has any doubts that such organizations are desirable, to 
at least some extent, and he has no subconscious drive for some kind of wholistic 
society like a commune. It  is clear that he feels that, for most people, the situation 
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in which they now find themselves, in which they deal with quite a number of 
different "corporations" ranging from different levels of democratic government 
through private corporations, schools, etc., is desirable in its main outlines. What 
Coleman wants to do is make changes in the details. 
In general, the changes he suggests are modest. For example, he suggests that 
our educational system should devote some attention to teaching people to dea l  
with corporations, as well as teaching them to deal with individuals. He points out 
that in many cases the corporation has much more information than the people 
with whom it deals, and devotes a good deal of  attention to suggesting ways of 
evening up the information problem. As one example, which should interest most 
academics, he points out that universities obtain a great deal of information about 
the students under consideration for admission, but do not make available very 
much information t o  the students. He suggests that the universities be compelled to 
allocate funds to informing potential students which are about the same amount as 
the funds they now use to obtain information about the students. Further, he 
suggests that these funds not be disbursed by the university itself but by some 
consumer-oriented organization. The last sentence sounds naive, but Coleman is of 
course fully aware o f  the difficulties of  estabiishing "corporations" that are con- 
sumer-oriented in practice and has no utopian dreams in this area. 
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